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How to Talk About Sentencing
Policy—and Not Disparity
Judge Nancy Gertner*
I had difficulty deciding what to speak about in this keynote address.
First, I want to talk about why I don’t want to discuss sentencing
disparity, why this is an issue far, far less important than issues of
sentencing fairness, of proportionality, of what works to address crime.
Disparity-speak has sucked the air out of all interesting and meaningful
discussion of criminal justice reform for the past several decades.
Second, I want to recount one case that dramatizes why the debate on
sentencing disparity is beside the point, why we need to talk about real
problems of real offenders.
Now, of course, sentencing disparity is important even though I don’t
want to talk about it. We tell the same disparity stories over and over
again. The chair of the United States Sentencing Commission, a very
distinguished judge, spoke to my Harvard Comparative Sentencing class
this past week, recounting the usual narrative. 1 During the Vietnam
War era, federal judges were obliged to sentence convicted draft
* The Honorable Nancy Gertner is a graduate of Barnard College and Yale Law School where
she was an editor of The Yale Law Journal. She received her MA in political science at Yale
University. President Clinton appointed her to the bench in 1994, and in 2008 she received the
Thurgood Marshall Award from the American Bar Association Section of Individual Rights and
Responsibilities. Judge Gertner is only the second woman to receive this award (Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg was the first). More recently, Judge Gertner received the ABA’s Margaret Brent
Award, given by the Commission on Women. She has written and spoken widely on various
legal issues and has appeared as a keynote speaker, panelist, and lecturer concerning civil rights,
civil liberties, employment, criminal justice, and procedural issues throughout the U.S., Europe,
and Asia. Her autobiography, In Defense of Women: Memoirs of an Unrepentant Advocate, was
released on April 26, 2011. Her book, The Law of Juries, co-authored with attorney Judith
Mizner, was published in 1997 and updated yearly. She has published articles and chapters on
sentencing, discrimination, forensic evidence, women’s rights, and the jury system. In September
of 2011, Judge Gertner retired from the federal bench to join the faculty of the Harvard Law
School. She has taught a number of subjects including criminal law, criminal procedure, forensic
science, and sentencing, and continues to teach and write about women’s issues around the world.
1. The Chair of the United States Sentencing Commission is Judge Patti B. Saris. About the
Commissioners, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N (last updated June 2013), http://www.ussc.gov/about/
commissioners/about-commissioners.
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dodgers. 2 In one courtroom, the draft dodger would get probation and
in the other, the draft dodger would get ten years. Yes, that was
troubling (although the draft dodger example was sui generis; the
Vietnam War divided the American public and surely its judges). In
fact, there was very little accurate data on federal sentencing in the preGuidelines era. Significantly, much of the discussion was anecdotal,
certainly not the product of careful study; there must be disparity in
sentencing, the critics reasoned, 3 since prior to the Sentencing Reform
Act of 1987 4 there was no appellate review and no guidelines.
But the truth of the charge of sentencing disparity was less important
than the mythology. The mythology of rampant sentencing disparity
without guidelines has driven American sentencing for decades. The
problem is that you cannot build a rational sentencing regime if the only
important question is this one: Am I doing the same thing in my
courtroom that you are doing in yours, even if neither of us is imposing
sentences that make sense, namely, that work to reduce crime? You
cannot talk about disparity unless you understand the context—disparity
in sentencing with respect to what?
What purposes?
What
characteristics? Similarly situated with respect to what? The offense?
The chances of deterrence? Amenability to treatment?
I don’t even want to talk about disparity’s twin brother, which is
unjust uniformity—treating different people alike: treating the man who
is dealing drugs from the car in which he is living the same as the man
who is dealing drugs to buy a Porsche to sit next to his Bentley, to cite
one example. 5 To eliminate sentencing disparity, the United States
Sentencing Commission and Congress chose to treat drug quantity the
same across contexts, contexts that were very different. I want to talk
about those contexts and the content of a just sentence. How do we deal
with drug addiction? What is the punishment that makes sense? When
is drug treatment appropriate in lieu of imprisonment? I want to talk
2. See VIETNAM WAR ERA: PEOPLE AND PERSPECTIVES 152 (Mitchell K. Hall ed., 2009)
(recounting how Walter Collins received a twenty-five year sentence for draft evasion and David
Bell received two years in a federal prison).
3. See James M. Anderson et al., Measuring Interjudge Sentencing Disparity: Before and
After the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. & ECON. 271, 271–72 (1999) (noting that while
sentencing guidelines have reduced inter-judge disparity—which was about 4.9 months at the
time the Guidelines were implemented—they also eliminate the judge’s ability to correct for
disparity elsewhere in the system); see also MARVIN FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW
WITHOUT ORDER 6 (1973) (writing that federal judges were answerable only to their varieties of
consciences and could hand out varying sentences).
4. 18 U.S.C. § 3551 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); 28 U.S.C. § 991 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
5. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for Less
Aggregation, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 901, 902 (1991) (arguing that the movement from individualized
to aggregated sentences is a backward step in the search for just criminal punishments).
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about problem solving courts, reentry programs, and meaningful
diversions. How can neuroscience help us craft treatment? What
evidence based practices should we implement? What works?
And, above all, I want to talk about how to meaningfully undo the
catastrophe of mass incarceration in this country, the catastrophe that
we have created with our dual emphasis on eliminating disparity, and
imprisonment as a cure all. It is a “one size fits all” approach, and that
“size” has been ever more imprisonment. I want to talk about our
uniformity-focused, criminal-record emphasis, incarceration-obsessed
criminal justice policy.
But before I talk about substance, sentencing content, and context, I
have to address why this is such a difficult conversation in our country,
even today. I’ve written a great deal about the guidelines, particularly
in one article, “A Short History of American Sentencing: Too Little
Law, Too Much Law, or Just Right,” 6 to borrow from “Goldilocks and
the Three Bears.” “Too Little Law” was the period of indeterminate
sentencing, when there was unlimited judicial discretion. “Too Much
Law” was the period of mandatory guidelines, and I suggested, “Just
Right” was the period after the Supreme Court’s decision in United
States v. Booker, 7 when the federal sentencing guidelines were ruled to
be advisory. The seeds of our inability to talk about substance, context,
and content lies in that history.
Let me begin with indeterminate sentencing. I don’t rhapsodize
about the indeterminate sentencing pre-Guidelines era. Sentencing
statutes prescribed broad statutory ranges for each offense of
conviction. Judges had substantial discretion; there was no appellate
review of sentencing and, as a result, no meaningful discussion of
sentencing principles and policies. Without appellate review of
sentencing, judges didn’t have to give reasons for the sentences they
gave. You didn’t have to write an opinion; your decision would not be
examined by anyone. Small wonder that people experienced the system
as chaotic. Small wonder that when charges of sentencing disparity
were leveled, no one could rebut them.
There were no substantive discussions of proportionality, even at the
constitutional level. Constitutional challenges, with the exception of the
death penalty, were about process and not substance. 8 Did you have a
6. Judge Nancy Gertner, A Short History of American Sentencing: Too Little Law, Too Much
Law, or Just Right, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 691 (2010).
7. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
8. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 298 (2006) (appealing a sentencing procedure
that deprived defendant of his federal constitutional right to have a jury determine beyond a
reasonable doubt all facts legally essential to his sentence).
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hearing? Were you informed of the charges? If yes, no matter that you
received twenty-five years for that third strike involving the theft of golf
clubs as in Ewing v. California. 9
Significantly, other common law countries in the American period of
“Too Little Law,” had appellate review of sentencing, without
guidelines: Canada, Israel, the United Kingdom, and Australia. While
there were limitations, something akin to a common law of sentencing
evolved—a statement of judicial principles about sentencing: a body of
precedent, not unlike the body of precedent in torts or contracts.
Without guidelines imposed from above, judges in other countries had
to write opinions of some sort because they knew they would be
reviewed.10 Appellate judges in those countries had to be conversant
with sentencing principles and at the very minimum, had to identify
improper sentences at least at the margins, the sentences that were
grossly lenient or grossly punitive.
In the 1980s, the period of “Too Much Law,” as I have described it,
there were sentencing guidelines, mandatory minimum statutes, and
suddenly, for American courts, appellate review. The district court
judge, who did not have to say much before Guidelines, still did not
have to say very much. For the most part, and there were surely
exceptions, the only opinion he or she had to write or say was—fill in
the boxes of the Guideline grid—for example, offense level, thirty,
criminal history, two. The only judgment he or she had to make was
where in the very limited range of the box (no more than twenty-four
months) the defendant would be sentenced. And the new appellate
review was the judicial equivalent of a second grade drawing exercise.
Have you stayed within the (Guideline) lines? If you have not, you’re
reversed.
Judicial decisions on the district court level and appellate decisions
did not look anything like appellate reviews of sentencing opinions in
other jurisdictions. Appellate judges who had never known any other
kind of sentencing review authored mechanistic Guideline analysis. Let
me say that again. Appellate judges who were reviewing sentencing for
the first time post-Guidelines had no framework within which to

9. 538 U.S. 11 (2003).
10. See Arie Frieberg, Australia: Exercising Discretion in Sentencing Policy and Practice, 22
FED. SENT. R. 204, 205 (2010) (describing how the Australian approach to sentencing starts with
the premise that there is no single, objective starting point from which a judge can determine a
sentence and also takes into account all relevant consideration); Gertner, supra note 6, at 695
(noting that unlike other common-law countries, American courts have limited appellate review
of sentencing). See generally SENTENCING AND SANCTIONS IN WESTERN COUNTRIES (Michael
Tonry ed., 2001) (tracing the evolution of sentencing laws and practices in Western countries).
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understand sentencing, other than the Guideline framework. And so
they enforced the Guidelines with a rigor that no one had anticipated.
A student of mine, using interesting neuroscience research, suggested
that sentencing prior to the Guidelines had been an intuitive process,
correlated with activity, she said, in the socio-affective region of the
brain, not regions typically associated with cognition. 11 It was all about
hunch and intuition, rather than cold deduction from legal principles.
She suggested that under a Guideline regime, we might find a different
part of the brain involved, namely the cognitive regions, rather than
those associated with emotive or affective responses. After all, in a
sentencing guidelines regime, someone else does the weighing, the
evaluating. Someone else comes to grips with the emotional costs and
the moral dilemmas of sentencing. The decision that results from
Guideline computations feels eminently rational, eminently antiseptic
because someone else did the thinking. I [the judge] did not have to do
much. All I had to do was fill in the boxes.
In fact, I would go further: Guideline discussion—what I call
“Guideline speak”—silenced all substantive discussions of meaningful
criminal justice reform. Every sentencing conference that I attended
was about sentencing disparity or Guideline enforcement. Few talked
about drug addiction, evidence-based practices, what actually made
sense. Few conferences addressed the very real questions I had to deal
with in my courtroom: What punishment works for this offender?
It would be one thing if the Guidelines represented rational
sentencing policy.
Indeed, I wouldn’t mind if the Sentencing
Commission did the thinking for me as a judge, if the thinking that they
did was based on data, principles of proportionality, and had an
understandable rationale. Too often, it was not.
The United States Sentencing Commission was not a real expert
commission in the sense that it was composed of neutral actors,
including sociologists, criminologists, working above the fray,
considering the appropriate sentences unmoored from the pathological
politics of crime. This Commission was political from the outset, what
Justice Scalia called “a junior-varsity Congress.” 12 Rather than being
independent of Congress, they were in some measure, its megaphone.
The Commission balanced Democratic and Republican representation;
its members had to be confirmed by the Senate; a representative of the
Department of Justice was an ex officio member—a status that the
11. Rebecca Krauss, Neuroscience and Institutional Choice in Federal Sentencing Law, 120
YALE L.J. 367, 369 (2010).
12. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 427 (1989).
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Federal Public Defender did not have. The Sentencing Guidelines were
supposed to have been based on real data, the actual sentencing
practices extant at the time of their promulgation. But they were not.
Because there were few written judgments across the country, the
Commission had to reconstruct sentencing practices from a less than
accurate set of records. They essentially identified the factors that they
thought were salient, which were not necessarily the factors the judges
relied upon. They discounted probation—which they counted as zero
time—and in many instances, just increased the sentences without
explanation. There was no room for consideration of rehabilitation or
deterrence, or even proportionality.
The traditional culpability
factors—in particular, mens rea—were rejected because their evaluation
required judgment, and could lead to disparate results, even though
those factors were essential to the just sentence. Instead, the
Commission emphasized so called objective factors like quantity or
criminal record, 13 factors that created a false uniformity of treatment
across contexts and circumstances.
Worse yet, Guideline-speak changed the American bench. It was not
simply the fact that most of the bench was selected post Guidelines, and
came to define fairness in sentencing by the contrived grid. Some
judges came to believe that their expertise was supplanted. They did
not have to do their own thinking, and worse yet, after Guidelines, some
believed they shouldn’t.
In 2005, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines became advisory, under
United States v. Booker, ushering in the period that I refer to—tongue in
cheek—as “Just Right.” This period could have been enormously
creative, a discussion of meaningful substantive reform. The Guidelines
were the starting point of analysis, but they bound no judge. They could
be critiqued, evaluated, and rejected if appropriate. Other sentencing
approaches could be discussed, evaluated, and considered.
To some degree, there has been a more open, more substantial
discussion of sentencing alternatives. The Commission has made some
changes to the Guidelines post-Booker, but the overall picture has not
dramatically changed. Eighty percent of the federal bench follows the
Guidelines—advisory or not. 14 Most judges have not changed their
13. See Alschuler, supra note 5, at 918–24 (discussing the Commission’s treatment of drug
offenses that emphasized its reliance on the weight of the drugs to determine sentencing). See
generally Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on
Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1685–91 (1992) (examining the evolution of the
current system of Commission-guided sentencing).
14. Uncertain Justice: The Status of Federal Sentencing and the U.S. Sentencing Commission
Six Years After U.S. v. Booker, Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland
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sentencing approaches post-Booker; most, at best, pay lip service to the
decision. In effect, the overall message is something like, “yes, the
guidelines are advisory, but they are the best we can do! Why should
we do anything else?” With some very notable exceptions, few judges
write opinions articulating a common law of sentencing, providing a
framework alternative to Guideline-speak, much less struggle with the
question of what works.
To be sure, appellate review of sentences has changed post-Booker,
but not in any coherent way. Booker suggested that sentences could be
reviewed for “reasonableness” which has translated across the country
into a procedural review, largely without substantive content. 15 Again,
the appeals courts ask, “Have you followed the Guidelines?”—a
question not unlike the pre-Booker questions. And, “Have you made
any procedural errors?”—also, not unlike the prior regime. If there are
no procedural errors, if the Guideline analysis is correct, few appeals
courts will consider whether the sentence is substantively unreasonable,
whether the sentence is wildly disproportionate to any rational
sentencing scheme—for example, a ten-year sentence for a first
offender, non-violent drug offender, or even life for a marijuana
distributor.
Appellate courts that never engaged in substantive review of
sentences before Guidelines, who only knew Guideline-speak after the
Sentencing Reform Act, can do little more now. If a judge stays within
the Guidelines today, he or she is virtually assured of being affirmed.
And even if the judge strays outside the Guidelines, affirmance is still
likely without any substantive analysis. In short, anything goes—except
procedural error. Since nearly every sentence is affirmed, there is still
little or no discussion of the content of the decisions, what makes sense,
what sentences are proportionate, what works. The only question again
is, “Did you calculate the guidelines right? Did you make any
mistakes?” Not, “Did you appropriately deal with an addict? Did you
look at evidence-based practices? Did you consider alternatives to
incarceration?”
Appellate courts, after looking at the column of figures that is
Guideline analysis, refuse to say, “you know, that really makes no
sense.” Appellate judges who had never done that kind of analysis pre-

Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 10 (2011) (testimony of Judge Patti B.
Saris, United States Sentencing Commission); Michael Tonry, The U.S. Sentencing Commission’s
Best Response to Booker is to Do Nothing, 24 FED. SENT’G REP. 387, 393 (2012).
15. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49–51 (2007) (explaining how district court judges
and appellate courts should determine the reasonableness of sentences).
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Guidelines (“Too Little Law”), and never did it in the mandatory
Guideline regime (“Too Much Law”) are incapable of doing it today.
So let’s talk about content. It is more than a discussion of “less jail,”
however important that discussion may be. “Less jail” is no more a
coherent discussion of penal policy than was “more jail.” We need to
have a discussion about the relationship between all the social control
mechanisms in the society, and imprisonment. We need to have a
discussion about what to do with offenders in lieu of jail, during jail and
after. We need to have a discussion about what it is going to take to
undo what we have done—the failed experiment in mass incarceration.
In short, we need to have is a discussion of real change.
So let me give you an example about a person, a person that I had in
front of me, who ripped my soul out. Damien Perry was one of twentyone men charged in a drug conspiracy. He was accused of distributing
crack in small quantities on a street corner. Over a year, undercover
officers rode bicycles to buy crack from various people on this block, in
this conspiracy. It was truly a retail operation, disruptive to the
community to be sure, but still small scale. The indictment claimed that
the twenty-one men were part of a gang. Gang—the word was intended
to, and did, engender fear in the reader, even a dispassionate judicial
reader. You read into it a group of marauding African-American
teenagers.
But the reality was far from clear. Gang, in this situation, meant a
group of young men who lived on the same block all of their lives.
There was no initiation ritual; there were no colors; there was no
hierarchy; there was no chain of command. The leadership depended
just on the happenstance of your age, criminal record, and what kind of
access you had to the drugs. They had no one supplier or dealer; in fact
they competed with one another for customers and dealers. They just
hung out, shared similar life circumstances. And what were those life
circumstances?
Shredded families, high school dropouts, no
supervision, parents who were either in jail or working day and night,
too overwhelmed with their own problem to address their kids’ issues.
What I came to see was that this was not much of a gang at all. It was a
peer group, sadly, with guns.
Of course, they had violated the law, but the question was what was
to be done about it. Some of the twenty-one were violent; I had no
problem imposing severe punishments. Some cooperated with the
government for a lesser sentence, even though they too had been
violent, and hardly transformed by their apprehension. Cooperation was
just another business decision for them. The third category was cannon
fodder: young men, caught up in this sting, pressured to cooperate, to

GERTNER PRINT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

How to Talk About Sentencing Policy

11/16/2014 1:37 PM

321

enable the government to—as they said—”go up the ladder.”
Damien Perry was cannon fodder. He couldn’t cooperate with the
government. He didn’t know enough; he was on the ladder’s first rung.
When he appeared before me, I sensed something different. It was
not just his physical appearance. He was only twenty-one years old, a
stocky man with a left eye swollen shut. The presentence report told a
sadly not-unfamiliar story. His mother, who was seventeen when he
was born, turned to drug abuse and prostitution. He had no contact with
her from age three to age eight, when there was a brief visit after which
she went to jail. He never spoke to her again. His father was fifteen
when he was born, far too young to care for him. Damien had no
contact with his father until he was nearly ten years old. He was raised
by a maternal grandmother, who reported that he had a wonderful
memory and described him as bright and articulate, but she was having
difficulty controlling him.
At sixteen he and a friend were playing with a gun—also not an
unfamiliar scene. It accidently fired. Damien was shot in the head,
losing his left eye. Doctors could not remove the pieces of the bullet
because they were too close to a major artery. The fragments remained
in his brain causing him headaches so severe he could not speak. He
had hearing loss, blood clots, and occasional seizures. He became
clinically depressed. He contemplated suicide. His life changed
dramatically. He was now a teenager with needs far more complex than
even the usual ones, and far too complex for his grandmother to deal
with. He got in trouble in school, skipped classes, had skirmishes with
the juvenile justice system, but no meaningful adult record. He was
suspended from school as a result of his absenteeism and then
withdrew.
I can’t tell you the numbers of people that I sentenced like Damien,
who had been either kicked out of school, or left school in tenth or
eleventh grade. Judge Reena Raggi of the Second Circuit, who had
been an Assistant United States Attorney in New York, when asked by a
newly elected Mayor what law-enforcement initiatives she would
recommend with respect to drugs, replied: The best way to address the
city’s drug problem, would be with a first class school system. 16 The
staffer told her that that wasn’t politically feasible. 17 Imprisonment,
however, was.
So, back to Damien. Like many others, he was out of school by the
16. The Honorable Reena Raggi, Remarks at the Harvard Law School Federalist Society
Lunch Talk (Apr. 2, 2014).
17. Id.
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tenth or eleventh grade. There was no meaningful support network
once he left school. He had a brief turn on an assembly line, but he
ultimately left that too. He sold drugs to support himself. The only
network that was available to him was that group of kids on the street,
the peers in the “gang.”
At the sentencing, after he pled guilty, Damien was articulate and
respectful. He and I began to have a conversation in open court. His
lawyer was largely silent during the exchange. I held a five-day hearing
just to find out what had happened to Damien during his childhood that
led to these charges. What was the impact of his physical impairment?
I wanted to make sense of what I was about to do. The legal framework
was completely onerous. Happily, there was no mandatory minimum
statutory sentence in this case, but the Guidelines were apparently
mandatory. The sentence would be determined 100% by the quantity of
drugs he had distributed on several occasions to the officers riding up
on their bicycles.
Nothing about what I had painstakingly learned about Damien’s
background and his disability entered into the calculus under the
Guideline regime. There was no place in the Guideline grid to talk
about his abandonment. There was no place in the grid to consider the
fact that the disarray in his life was very likely to repeat itself in the next
generation. I wasn’t supposed to try to understand the extent to which
lengthy incarceration would, in fact, exacerbate his problems. All I was
supposed to do was add up the amount he sold, figure out his criminal
record, look on the grid, and sentence within the range.
It didn’t even matter that, in Guideline-speak, the drug suppliers to
this group got lower sentences than the defendants who dealt on the
street. The suppliers had not directly interacted with the bike cops; the
quantity of drugs that they dealt could only be estimated and resulted in
a lower calculation than the calculations for the other defendants.
With the video taken by the police and the testimony of cooperating
witnesses, Damien had no choice but to plead guilty. The government’s
recommendation was 135–168 months. It was, in short, ridiculous. If I
credited the government’s analysis, I would have classified Damien’s
offense level at thirty-two, a higher level than for offenses like
transmitting national defense information, assault with intent to murder,
criminal sexual abuse, kidnapping, abduction, and unlawful restraint.18

18. See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2A2.1 (2013)
(stating that the base offense level for assault with intent to commit murder not in the first degree
is 27(a)); id. § 2A3.1(a) (2013) (stating that the base offense level for criminal sexual abuse not
committed under 18 U.S.C. § 2241(c) is 30); id. § 2A4.1(a) (2013) (stating that the base offense
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The principle question under the Guidelines was quantity, and in terms
of that quantity, Damien’s background, and family, his real culpability
relative to the others, was simply irrelevant.
Although the Guidelines were mandatory, I worked mightily to
interpret them in as humane a way as I could. There was a little used
category for “extraordinary physical condition” under the Guidelines
that enabled a departure. To protect against reversal, I wrote a lengthy
opinion about the category “extraordinary physical condition,” and how
it applied to Damien. 19 Where my contemporaries, judges in other
common law countries, were writing about sentencing policy and
deterrence, about the relationships between the goals of sentencing and
these individual offenders, Guideline-speak obliged me to write about
“bullets in the brain,” Damien’s “extraordinary physical circumstances.”
I wrote “Damien Perry has a bullet in his brain. The question is whether
that is an extraordinary physical circumstance sufficient to warrant a
downward departure. To ask the question, is to answer it.” 20
The Guideline result was plainly excessive; there was a basis to
depart, but then what was I to do? What should I take into account?
What sentencing principles ought I apply? What programs ought I
consider? I sentenced Damien to forty-seven months with substantial
post-supervision detention, drug treatment, etc. Probation was not an
option, although it is what I would have given at the time. I knew that if
I had departed from the Guidelines to that degree, the First Circuit
would have reversed me in a nanosecond. And I could craft conditions
on supervised release, hoping that they would address his real problems.
I could not meaningfully control what would happen to him during his
imprisonment, but I could try to exercise some control afterwards.
I made it a habit of keeping track of the defendants I sentenced. I
even visited the prisons when I could. I never wanted to forget what it
was like when I was a young criminal defense lawyer visiting a prisoner
in a maximum-security prison in Massachusetts. I went into the
antechamber; the door behind me locked, and the door in front jammed.
I was stuck in the antechamber for perhaps fifteen to twenty minutes.
Even when I became a judge years later, I wanted to remember what
that experience had been like.
I saw Damien on one prison visit. He literally came running up to

level for kidnapping, abduction, and unlawful restraint is 32); id. § 2M3.3(a) (2013) (stating that
the base offense level for transmitting national defense information is 29 if it is top secret
information and 24 for all other information).
19. United States v. Lacy, 99 F. Supp. 2d 108, 115–17 (D. Mass. 2000).
20. Id. at 118.

GERTNER PRINT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

324

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

11/16/2014 1:37 PM

[Vol. 46

me, much to the chagrin of the officials, with newspaper clippings about
a case of mine. When he was released, he was supposed to report to
probation, but he reported to me. I got a close look at how dramatic the
changes from prison to freedom are. Behavior that is completely
adaptive in prison is completely maladaptive outside. In prison,
everything is done for you. Suddenly, you come into a world with a
thousand small decisions—a phone bill, rent, how to get from one place
to the other, how to deal with people you haven’t seen in years, how to
deal with technological change. We understand the dislocation a
prisoner of war feels on his return—and they may well be returning to
intact families, even supportive communities. The defendants I had
sentenced often return to shredded families, relationships that had long
ended.
Damien walked into my courtroom one day. I recognized him
immediately. At the recess, I invited him back to my lobby. We spoke
about his hopes and dreams for life outside of prison. I saw him
struggle reuniting with a father who then barely knew him. My sons
were about Damien’s age. I tried to help. At the time there was no
reentry program. He’d come out with all the same issues with which he
had entered: limited education, limited support, no place to live,
disabled, and, worse, with a criminal record. He was disqualified from
federal programs, and he could not live in public housing. Adaptation
would have been difficult if he was not impaired, and he was impaired.
Then one Saturday morning, at about eleven o’clock, I got a call from
the Assistant U.S. Attorney: “Judge, I’m sorry to interrupt your
Saturday.” “That’s okay, what’s going on?” “Damien Perry was
executed on the streets of Boston yesterday at noon. Gunned down on a
street corner. Judge, I don’t know whether he went back to the gang.”
Maybe he did “return” to the gang, whatever the gang was. Perhaps he
went back, we offered no meaningful alternative or, if he did not, maybe
he could never escape that identification.
Again, I did something un-judgelike. I called the Boston Globe. I
did not want another article that would say, “Gang Member Executed
on the Streets of Boston.” I wanted them to write about him, and the
promise he had. To the reporter, there was no “Damien Perry” story
worth writing about. She would not write about Damien Perry unless
she wrote about me as well. The headline was “Shooting Death Shatters
a Rare Bond.” 21 The article was about our relationship: Judge Gertner

21. Maria Cramer, Shooting Death Shatters a Rare Bond: Judge Mourns Ex-Gang Member,
BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 10, 2007, at A1.
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and Damien Perry. 22
The family invited me to Damien’s funeral and, in fact, Damien’s
father wanted me to read that article to the assembled group. And I did.
As I was leaving the church, feeling that I hadn’t done much at all, the
father reported to me that Damien had often said to him, “Judge Gertner
would be happy about this,” or more likely, “Oh my gosh, is she going
to be mad at me?”
What happened to Damien made me want to look at the other twentyone I sentenced. I want to ask what worked, even post hoc. Not one of
the twenty-one succeeded. Only one escaped jail or the criminal justice
system, and that may well be because we lost track of him. He left the
state.
Today we debate whether drug courts or reentry courts are effective.
One thing is clear: jail is not. If there were any other social policy with
the abysmal record of imprisonment we would have abandoned it long
ago. Was Damien’s neighborhood cleaned up? The crack dealers in
Damien’s case were taken off the street, but there is a 100%
replacement rate, often by younger, more violent offenders. 23 And what
about deterrence? Damien reported that everyone in his neighborhood
expected to be in jail at some time or other. How did jail deter them?
I want to talk about content for Damien’s sake. I want to talk about
the substance of sentencing policy. I want to talk about what to do with
the Damien’s of the world. I want to talk about what works.
We’re at a unique moment. No one could have envisioned this time
in the United States. No one could have envisioned that this would be a
moment when Rand Paul, Newt Gingrich, and Patrick Leahy, along
with the Sentencing Commission, are working to reduce drug sentences
and enable judicial discretion. They are finally decrying what has been
described as America’s failed experiment in mass incarceration. 24 But
22. Id.
23. See Jonathan P. Caulkins & Philip B. Heymann, How Should Low Level Drug Dealers Be
Punished?, in DRUG ADDICTION AND DRUG POLICY: THE STRUGGLE TO CONTROL DEPENDENCE
206, 208 (Philip P. Heymann & William N. Brownsberger eds., 2001) (noting that due to the
“replacement effect,” new street level drug dealers replace those who have been imprisoned).
24. See Nancy Gertner, After Horton Case, Massachusetts Fell Behind on Criminal Justice,
BOSTON GLOBE, May 18, 2014, http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2014/05/17/after-hortoncase-massachusetts-fell-behind-criminal-justice/TfnkbFiKt6ptnc8clqtq3K/story.html (stating how
Massachusetts’ prison system fell “in like with America’s failed experiment in mass
incarceration”). By 2010, the United States boasted the world’s largest prison population, beating
out countries we regularly criticize on human rights abuses including Russia, China, and Iran.
See Press Release, The National Academies, U.S. Should Significantly Reduce Rate of
Incarceration; Unprecedented Rise in Prison Population ‘Not Serving the Country Well,’ Says
News Report (Apr. 30, 2014), available at http://www8.nationalacademies.org/onpinews/new
sitem.aspx?RecordID=18613 (citing facts related to the staggering prison populations in
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lowering sentences is not enough; discretion will only work if the
judges are willing to exercise it in a way that they have not done in the
years post-Booker.
We have to talk about meaningful reform, the way in which we’ve
used the criminal justice system in lieu of dealing with social problems.
We have to have a substantive discussion about mental health, welfare,
and collateral consequences of conviction. We have to have to talk
about resources for education, counseling, and not just sentencing
disparity. We have to strategize about how to undo what we have so
sadly done for decades. Exceptional times call for exceptional steps.
Conferences such as this are an important beginning.
But back to Damien. If the school had kept him from dropping out, if
there were some way to intervene, if I could have exercised more
discretion to fashion a just and proportional sentence, if I could have
sentenced him to community corrections or a well-established drug and
reentry program, would it have made a difference? I don’t know. All I
know is that what I did, did not.
Judge Morris Lasker, of the United States District Court for the
Southern District of N.Y, then the District of Massachusetts, gave an
interview in 1997 in which he said, “it is time to begin the end of
America’s love affair with imprisonment.” 25 To which, I can only say
“amen.” For Damien, let’s talk about real reform.

America).
25. Hon. Morris E. Lasker, Remarks Before Symposium on Sentencing Guidelines (Sept. 9,
1997), available at http://web.archive.org/web/20070401232722/http://www.vcl.org/Judges/Lask
er_J.htm.

